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Abstract 
 
The JASON-1 small satellite was launched in December 2001 and has performed successfully since one year and a 
half, with in-flight performances exceeding expectations. 
 
The JASON-1 mission is dedicated to ocean and climate forecasting, in continuation to the successful TOPEX-
POSEIDON satellite, launched in 1992. 
 
This project is a cooperation between NASA and CNES. JASON-1 is the first satellite based on the small 
PROTEUS bus, a cooperative partnership between CNES and Alcatel Space Industries. This project was initiated in 
1993 and entered in 1996 in its development phase. At that time, the "Faster, Better, Cheaper" guidelines were 
driving the decisions and thus strong budgetary and schedule constraints were placed on the project while keeping 
ambitious technical performances. 
 
After more than one year of Jason operations in orbit, this paper gives a synthetic view of the major project 
achievement with respect to the initial requirements with a focus on advantages and drawbacks of a fast- paced 
development and qualification, with emphasis on what has been successful and what would need to be adjusted in a 
future similar development. 
._____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Introduction 
 
The development of the Jason system was a real 
challenge for many reasons, among them, one can 
notice: 
 
• The development of a complete system with a new 
satellite bus as well as new end users product 
definition and  new control and mission ground 
segment. 
• The continuation of a fruitful NASA/CNES 
cooperation but with an almost totally reverse 
responsibility sharing with respect to TOPEX/ 
POSEIDON organization. 
• The first launch of a CNES Satellite on a Delta II 
launcher from the Vandenberg launch site, in a 
dual launch configuration. 
• The establishment of new relationship between 
CNES and the Space Industry through partnership 
instead of standard contractual relations. 
• The first CNES try to apply a "Faster, Better, 
Cheaper" approach. 
• The first CNES satellite with routine operations 
delegated to an other entity. 
 
The excellent behavior of the entire system since 
launch clearly shows that these challenges have been 
met with success.  
 
One of the major achievements was to reduce the cost 
of the mission from about one half, with respect to the 
previous TOPEX mission, while keeping the same in 
flight-performances, in less than 5 years of 
development cycle.  
 
The Jason-1 mission and satellite 
 
The main scientific objectives for the new Jason-1 
altimetry mission were defined after examining 
feedback from the TOPEX/POSEIDON mission. 
 
The first discipline to benefit from these remarkably 
accurate tools is physical oceanography. This includes 
ocean circulation, multi-season to multi-year 
variability, mesoscale variability, changes in mean sea 
level, tides and sea state conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig.1. El Nino forecasting 
 
 
The Jason-1 three axis stabilized satellite is 
approximately 3.4 m high and has a total mass of 490 
Kg (275 Kg for the platform and 175 Kg for the 
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payload module including science instruments). Jason-
1 is about five times lighter than TOPEX. 
 
Once in orbit, the two sets of solar panel of 9.5 m2 
generates about 500 Watts. Jason-1 is designed to last 
for an operational mission of 3 years and an extended 
mission of  2 years, all life limited elements being sized 
for at least 5 years. 
 
 
Fig.2 . The JASON-1 Satellite 
 
The satellite is carrying a payload of 5 instruments. A 
two-frequency altimeter called Poseidon-2 and a 
DORIS orbitography system are provided by CNES. 
NASA has provided a three frequency radiometer, a 
GPS location system and a laser reflector. All these 
instruments, with the exception of the laser are 
redundant. 
 
Jason-1 has been launched together with TIMED from 
the Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) on a DELTA 
II launch vehicle (7920-10) built by Boeing and 
provided by NASA, in a Dual Payload configuration 
with a new Payload Attach Fitting that allow to carry 
two satellites at the same time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Jason-1 Launch configuration 
 
The Jason-1 Control ground segment : 
 
It is comprised of: 
• A Jason Command Control Center (JCCC) located 
in Toulouse that monitors the satellite during the 
whole mission lifetime. 
• A Project Operation Control Center (POCC) 
located in Pasadena that takes over the routine 
activities from JCCC at the end of the assessment 
phase. 
• An Earth Terminal Network of three ground 
stations, located in Aussaguel (France), Poker Flat 
(USA) and Wallops (USA) as back up site. 
 
The Mission ground segment  
 
With the prospect of two major altimetry missions, 
Jason-1 and Envisat (ESA), CNES has implemented a 
new generation of ground control and science data 
processing center SSALTO (Segment Sol multi 
mission d'ALTimetrie,  Orbitographie et localisation 
précise), located at Toulouse.  
 
 
Jason-1 development context : requirements and 
constraints 
 
Jason-1 was the first satellite based on the PROTEUS 
bus. It was a very ambitious challenge both on a 
programmatic and technical standpoint to develop and 
validate  a product line and a first satellite in parallel. 
 
From the programmatic standpoint, it was the first 
partnership which CNES established with a satellite 
industrial contractor with equal financial participation 
from both.  
 
When, in mid- 1994, following NASA satellite funding 
shortcut, CNES indicated that the PROTEUS initiative 
could be the adequate solution to substantially reduce 
both spacecraft and mission costs, the PROTEUS 
program had just started Phase A. NASA agreed on 
this new sharing of responsabilities but the CNES 
commitment already put the PROTEUS development 
schedule on the critical path of the project. 
 
PROTEUS was based on flight-proven architectures 
and technologies, with emphasis on cost efficient 
procurement and development practices. 
 
The main characteristics of the PROTEUS Platform are 
given hereafter. The PROTEUS platform will be flown 
on multiple missions such as the CALIPSO project 
(NASA/ CNES), the COROT Astronomy satellite and 
the SMOS (ESA/ CNES) satellite. 
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Orbit Any orbit altitude in 500- 1500 Km range 
Orbit inclination higher than 20 deg  
Launch Vehicles Compatible with all launch vehicle with 
fairing diameter >1.9 m 
Mass Bus dry mass = 275 Kg 
28 Kg hydrazine capacity 
Payload mass = 100 to 275 Kg 
Reliability 0.889 at 3 years 
0.754 at 5 years 
Lifetime 3 to 5 years depending upon the orbit 
Power Bus maximum consumption = 300 W 
Payload consumption class = 200 W 
Up to 300 W on some orbits 
Pointing Attitude 
Restitution 
0.05 deg (3 sigma) on each axis 
Data Storage 2 Gbits for payload 
Down link 722 kbits/s 
Up link 4 kbits/sec 
Unavailability 0.82 % 
  Table 1. PROTEUS Platform Performances 
 
By the time the development started, the "Faster, 
Better, Cheaper " paradigm was very common among 
the small satellites community. This generally 
translated into several “guidelines” like : 
• Use as much as possible electronic parts of  
"commercial" standard as opposed to usual "space" 
or "military" standard. 
• Strongly "success oriented" schedule with 
important development and validation phase 
overlapping and parallel activities. 
• Strong reliance on benches to validate the system 
and its operational behavior. 
• Reduction of the number of system and element 
reviews as well as simplification and alleviation of 
their progress and minimization of the 
documentation. 
• Maximum use of COT's (Commercial Off The 
shelf) equipments. 
• Decrease of the number of redundancies. 
• Limitation in the funding, both applied to 
development and operational cost. 
 
Major Project achievements 
 
Use as much as possible electronic parts of  
"commercial" or "military" standard as opposed to 
usual "space" standard: 
 
Finally, only a very few number of commercial 
components are actually flying on board Jason-1:  
• On the payload instrument side, all the instruments 
on board Jason-1 had a very strong heritage from 
the ones flying on TOPEX and it was always 
argued by the industrial contractor that moving to 
commercial part will strongly affects this heritage 
and thus strongly increase overall cost even if the 
EEE components cost was reduced. 
• On the satellite bus, using "off the shelf" 
equipment was strongly  encouraged and those 
equipment were existing with space or military 
standard EEE components. Finally, our experience 
in the use of commercial parts was at that time 
very limited, especially in a harsh radiation 
environment like the one existing on the Jason 
orbit. 
 
In addition, specific procurement rules were to be 
developed for those new components. At the same 
time, due to the pre-operational constraint, life time, 
reliability and availability objectives were not relaxed, 
and this resulted in a very “classical” approach leading 
to the use of "known" space or military EEE 
components. 
 
Strongly "success oriented" schedule with important 
development phase overlapping and parallel 
activities: 
 
To summarize, with respect to the initial planned 
launch date (March 1999), the total schedule slip was 
about 19 months of which 6 are directly due to a 
structural SADM ( Solar Array Drive Mechanism) 
failure that was discovered very lately in the satellite 
qualification program, and other 13 month mostly 
related to test benches development and validation 
delays which impacted the overall system and 
operational qualification. 
 
Equipment and instrument delivery and Spacecraft 
Assembly, Integration and Test process were already 
close to the critical path. This ambitious schedule was 
imposed "a priori" without having checked that the 
relevant resources were available and if the associated 
“function-sliced” architecture was adequate. 
 
This schedule was an "incentive tool" which proved to 
be efficient at first but this efficiency strongly 
decreased when it turned out that the schedule was no 
longer realistic. The schedule pressure can lead to 
contradictory objectives. The good compromise is to 
maintain some "pressure" while keeping reasonable 
objectives. 
 
In the end, 5 years to design, develop, and validate a 
complete space system from flight hardware to end 
users interface, while qualifying a fully new satellite 
bus, with highly ambitious performances objectives 
and without accepting strong mission risk increase, 
remains a remarkable achievement both by the space 
agencies and the industrial community. 
 
Strong reliance on benches to validate the system and 
its operational behavior: 
 
In order to cope with the parallelization of activities, an 
important part of the validation would have to rely on 
the satellite simulator bench while running in parallel 
the satellite Integration and Test activities. But an 
underestimate of the workload to develop the benches 
associated with some technical problems related to 
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their complexity made the development and validation 
of the benches themselves much more longer and 
difficult than expected. 
 
These benches, used for satellite functional validation 
and for overall system operational qualification, proved 
to be very efficient with a very good representativity of 
the real hardware. Thanks to these benches, the test 
coverage of the Jason system by the time of the launch 
was very good. For future application, the same 
strategy will be applied and a numerical simulator, 
easier to develop and duplicate will be used in addition 
for the preparation of operations. 
 
Reduction of the number of system and element 
reviews as well as simplification and alleviation of 
their progress: 
 
Phase A and PDR system reviews were “lightened” 
thanks to a strong system preliminary definition 
strongly inherited from TOPEX. 
 
For all major Jason satellite or system reviews, the 
process of the reviews was adapted to fit within 3 
working days. An other factor that influenced strongly 
the review process was the decision taken by NASA to 
systematically implement a Red Team review process 
before authorizing a mission launch. 
 
This process was also applied on Jason, from the 
satellite qualification review until launch. In order to 
avoid adding more reviews to the process, it was 
decided to have the NASA Red Team review board 
participating to the major project reviews in parallel to 
the CNES Standing Review Board. This process 
proved to be very efficient with both review groups 
working closely, each one issuing its own report after 
coherency checking. In the end, the overall Jason 
system review process proved to be as efficient as for 
any other complex project.  
 
Maximum use of COTS (Commercial Off the Shell) 
equipment: 
 
Most of the PROTEUS platform equipment were not 
exactly COTS but derived from existing equipment 
already used in space application. Their procurement 
rules, both in terms of contractual rules and technical 
aspects, have been customized according to their 
"recurrence" level. Four categories have been defined : 
• A) Equipment specifically developed for 
PROTEUS, 
• B) Equipment already developed and qualified for 
other programs but with modifications needed for 
PROTEUS, 
• C) Equipment already qualified, no modifications 
required, but a delta qualification (e.g mechanical 
environment) had to be performed 
• D) Equipment already qualified with specifications 
fully compliant with PROTEUS 
 
This strategy allowed the prime contractor to customize 
contractual and technical follow-up to each category of 
equipment and it proved to be a good practice with one 
exception, the SADM. 
 
This piece of equipment was not considered critical but 
the combination of organization problems among sub- 
contractors, heavy budgetary constraints, very limited 
risk assessment and also some “bad luck” 
circumstances, lead to a very critical situation with the 
late discovery of a structural failure. 
 
For the star tracker, the platform GPS and also the solar 
generator, the development was not really 
straightforward but in each case, Alcatel and CNES set 
in place the required resources to closely monitor and 
drive the corrective actions.   
 
Decrease of the number of redundancies: 
 
This was quickly discarded in view of the very strong 
impact on the overall reliability. In addition, it was 
always anticipated to have redundant payload 
instruments which in case of single string bus makes 
the satellite reliability figure totally unbalanced 
between payload and bus. Moreover, it was possible to 
implement redundancy while staying in the overall 
total mass cap of 500 Kg with a somewhat marginal 
impact on the overall cost due to the product line cost 
decrease effect. 
 
Other lessons learned : 
AI&T 
 
 
Fig.4. JASON-1 Mechanical test preparation 
 
The AI&T sequence of activities was sometimes 
impacted by anomalies which in the end did not impact 
the schedule due to the other critical path (benches).  
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Among the lessons learned, we found out that: 
• The Ground Support Equipment used in this 
sequence shall be carefully validated in its 
environment before starting satellite integration. 
• One should not postpone at a later stage a test that 
can be performed earlier in the sequence. This is 
often done due to schedule pressure but proved to 
be a source of problems occurring later and much 
more difficult to be identified and fixed. 
• The flexibility required when testing a new 
scientific payload. This dictates frequent 
modifications of test procedures which is often in 
conflicts with an industrial streamlined AI&T 
sequence. Here again, a compromise has to be 
found and the rules shall be agreed in advance by 
all partners. 
• Test at the launch site or on the launch pad shall be 
minimized. If satellite performance check has been 
correctly done before shipment, only limited 
"aliveness" test are needed. More over, the 
different environments between the satellite 
integration site and the launch site may lead to 
unexpected differences in the results that are then 
very difficult to track and explain. 
 
Preparation of operations 
 
In such a complex system like Jason, with one control 
center, one operation center, two mission centers and 
an earth terminal network, the overall operation 
preparation and training sequence is a long process 
requiring dedicated resources like a satellite simulator 
and is usually taking place at the end so most likely on 
the schedule critical path. The required resources 
(satellite simulator, RF suitcase…) as well as the 
system test requirements and constraints were 
identified very early in the development. The duration 
of the sequence, starting when the satellite simulator 
and most of the ground segment individual elements 
are validated is about year and can not be significantly 
reduced without an important increase of risk in the 
early phase of the mission in case of trouble on the 
satellite. By the time of Jason-1 launch, both CNES 
and JPL ground systems were fully qualified and 
opertors trained thanks to a very extensive set of 
operational test run, addressing nominal and 
contingency conditions. 
 
 NASA/CNES/Alcatel organization 
 
The Jason project organization was very complex with 
partnership between NASA and CNES at mission 
level, but also between CNES and Alcatel on the 
platform development. CNES acted also as the satellite 
prime contractor directly procuring the payload sensors 
(also through JPL). Ground segment elements were 
also spread out between NASA and CNES.  
 
The management rules between NASA and CNES 
were described in the Project Plan, directly applicable 
from the MOU. Various steering committees were 
defined between NASA and CNES on one hand and 
CNES and Alcatel on the other hand and adapted along 
the development of the program in order to have the 
right people at the right level and with the appropriate 
knowledge to take critical technical or programmatic 
decisions.  
 
This organization was efficient and sufficiently flexible 
to allow a good management process even in the case 
of "crisis" which sometimes occured. 
 
In Flight Observations 
 
The JASON-1 satellite has performed successfully 
since launch. The In-Flight acceptance review has 
demonstrated  the high quality of the spacecraft 
performances and of the scientific data. 
 
 Only one significant anomaly was discovered several 
months after launch. A progressive degradation of the 
Star Tracker assembly sensivity lead progressively to 
frequent tracking losses which could  impact in the end 
the overall pointing accuracy.  Nevertheless, the 
pointing performance was still inside the mission 
needs, despite the reduced availability.  
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Fig.5 . Star Tracker availability 
 
The phenomenon seems now to be stabilized and the 
actual conclusions of the Anomaly Review Board is 
that the loss of sensitivity is probably due to pollution 
inside the Star Tracker Assembly. As no further 
degradation has been observed, the actual availability 
figures are well within the required performances. A 
back-up plan has nevertheless been prepared to 
guarantee the Mission continuation.  
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